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Summary Judgment in Federal Practice:




Imagine, if you will, a pretrial motion that tests more than the
sufficiency of a pleading. Imagine a motion that considers more than
the mere existence of residual material fact issues - a motion more
diabolical and more deadly than any practitioner has dared to make
in the history of American civil litigation. Faster than a compulsory
counterclaim, more powerful than a preliminary injunction, able to
leap tall discovery materials in a single bound - it's super summary
judgment.
Without much fanfare, the staid and usually fruitless summary
judgment motion is undergoing a metamorphosis in the federal court
system. Until recently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was em-
ployed primarily to stop time-barred claims, cases involving clear im-
munity from liability, and cases in which absolutely no evidence sup-
ported the claim. Today, courts grant summary judgment when the
quality and quantity of evidence are insufficient to meet the pre-
scribed burden of proof. In other words, if plaintiff's burden is x and
plaintiff's evidence equals x minus .001, the court grants summary
judgment for defendant.
The Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,1 pushed the summary judgment standard into this new dimen-
sion. As a later discussion of that case reveals, if the summary judg-
ment movant plays her discovery cards correctly, she can create an
impression that the opposing party lacks evidence sufficient to meet
its burden at trial. The judge need not consider the multitude of ma-
terial fact issues raised by the complaint and answer. The judge
must determine whether an objective consideration of the evidence
palpably demonstrates a party's inability to prove its case. There is
no need to impanel a jury, it is reasoned, when a claimant would
* Associate, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. B.A., 1975, The Penn-
sylvania State University; J.D., 1984, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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suffer a directed verdict at trial anyway.
The standard for the new summary judgment is as slippery as
the standard for the old. In the past, each word of Rule 562 was
scrutinized without the emergence of a bright line interpretation:
What is genuine?8 How is an issue defined?4 What is meant by ma-
teriality? 5 What constitutes a fact? Each motion under Rule 56 calls
these questions into play and the courts' answers to them have not
been consistent.'
The post-Anderson standard provides the movant a second ap-
proach based on sufficiency of the evidence. Once the movant in-
troduces exculpatory evidence on its behalf, the claimant must
tender its prima facie evidence to the judge who weighs and mea-
sures the evidence against the claimant's burden. 7 According to An-
derson, if the evidence is insufficient it is impossible for the claimant
to meet its burden at trial. The slipperiness of the new standard is
caused by uncertainty regarding the quality or quantity of evidence
needed to meet the metaphysical burden.
Neither Anderson nor subsequent circuit court cases offer much
guidance for the trial judge who is faced with a quality or quantity
summary judgment motion. The courts granting such motions gener-
ally intone that under any measure of quality or quantity the claim-
ant's evidence fails to rise to the required level of proof.8 In such
determinations, when a judge is called upon to apply amorphous le-
gal principles to resolve potentially meritorious claims, the dimen-
2. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c):
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
3. Cameron v. Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Co., 824 F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 1987);
Cook v. Providence Hosp., 820 F.2d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1987).
4. Ivey St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
488 (1987).
5. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1987); Mission
Indians v. American Management & Amusement, Inc., 824 F.2d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 1987)
cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 7 (1988), modified, 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988); Kennedy v.
Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987).
6. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text and Table 1.
7. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) advises the nonmoving party to put forward
evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact when a motion for summary judgment is
supported by discovery evidence or affidavits. If the nonmoving party merely relies on the
allegations of its pleadings, the rule states that summary judgment should be entered "if
appropriate."
8. Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775, 781-82 (1st Cir.
1987); see also infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
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sions of the judge's discretion grow exponentially.9 In effect, the
judge weighs the credible evidence at the pre-trial stage and decides
whether the case should be preempted from review by the ultimate
fact-finder. The evidence may consist of self-serving affidavits, se-
lected incontroverted documents, bits and snatches of deposition
transcripts, and similar items. While the evidentiary materials may
be limited because of the timing of the summary judgment motion,
the judge must nevertheless determine the weight of each item of
evidence and, ultimately, decide whether the case should continue. 10
The dramatic adversarial clash of the parties may be reduced to a
series of cold affidavits, the comparison of which may not produce
what the judge considers to be a significant controversy. With An-
derson as support, the judge may doom the case by granting the
motion for summary judgment.
Several years have passed since the Supreme Court announced
its liberal standards for summary judgment. During that time, lower
courts have continued their struggle to apply the proper summary
judgment standards to the factual situations before them. This Arti-
cle, in part, chronicles that struggle. First, the Article explains the
new standards, their implications for motions practice in federal
court, and their effect on the discovery process. Next, the Article
reviews recent cases employing the new summary judgment stan-
dards to show how courts currently view the evidence necessary to
overcome summary judgment in the areas of age discrimination, li-
bel, and antitrust. Finally, the Article proposes a model for resolu-
tion of summary judgment motions based on epistemology, the study
of knowledge, and a concept called "epistemic coherence."
II. The Reinvention of Rule 56
A. The Need for Summary Judgment
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated
in 1937, the federal courts officially adopted notice pleading rather
9. In the federal system, trial judges are vested with discretion to manage discovery
proceedings and to direct trials. In a practical sense, these judges are vested with de facto
discretion to resolve the proper applications of legal principles enunciated by the appellate
courts. For example, the application of strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rationality
theories in an equal protection claim is extremely difficult for the trial judge because the ap-
pellate courts are unable to develop solid tests for each standard. See, e.g., Deibler v. City of
Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 334 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986).
10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a summary judgment motion to be filed
at any time by the defending party and, by the claimant, any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action.
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than essential fact pleading.11 Under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(a), the complainant need only set forth in the complaint "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and . . a demand for judgment for the relief the
pleader seeks." During the discovery phase, litigators are supposed to
elicit the facts required to send the claim to a jury. Indeed, the Fed-
eral Rules discourage judges who place high standards on pleading
craftsmanship, and encourage them to expedite the case into a pos-
ture for trial. 2
Although notice pleading has its virtues, including less cumber-
some pleadings and fewer traps for the unwary draftsman, it has its
share of vices. For example, it permits the perpetuation of cases ini-
tiated by ambiguous or frivolous complaints. It also allows facially
acceptable claims that are wholly unsupported by the true facts to
drift into the expensive and vexatious discovery phase.
To deal with the deluge of claims occasioned by notice pleading,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a mechanism by
which factually unsupported claims could be terminated before
trial.13 Rule 56 allows the court to enter summary judgment on a
claim or defense when no genuine issue of material fact remains for
trial."' The Rule also allows the court to decide certain issues before
trial based on the lack of factual controversy on the claim.15 In the-
ory, then, federal civil practice enjoys the freedom of notice pleading
without the agony of pursuing a frivolous or unsupported claim to
verdict.
Casting a shadow over the procedural rules is the constitutional
right to trial by jury in civil matters. No less formidable than any
other constitutional guarantee, the seventh amendment suffers as the
courts broaden summary judgment standards because it is summary
judgment that deprives a litigant of jury review. Although notice
pleading opens the courthouse doors to more filings, summary judg-
ment throws the claims back into the street. The seventh amendment
is not weakened, however, as long as live, factual controversies are
not numbered among the rejections. 6
Of course, the difficulty lies in determining the cases that merit
1I. In a notice pleading system complainants need not list chapter and verse of the of-
fense allegedly perpetrated by the defendant.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 8(f).
13. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.1 (1985).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
16. Moreover, it is clear that summary judgment does not per se abridge a civil litigant's
right to trial by jury. Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988).
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a jury trial and those that do not. The standard set forth in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, whether the "pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the af-
fidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact," has been applied with varying degrees of success by the dis-
trict courts. As Table 1 illustrates, the district courts had approxi-
mately a sixty percent success rate in 991 published appellate deci-
sions decided in 1986 dealing with summary judgment.1
7
Nevertheless, there were at least 401 cases in 1986 in which the dis-
trict judge had earlier ruled that no reasonable minds could differ as
to the material facts and the courts of appeals reasonably differed. 8
TABLE 1
Affirmances of Summary Judgments










































TOTAL 590 - 401 59.5%
17. These cases were reported in volumes 778 through 809 of Federal Reporter Second.
The table does not consider unpublished opinions, in which presumably the affirmance rate
would be higher.
18. For a view of the tension between district and appellate judges in the Third Circuit
regarding the court of appeals' strict interpretation of summary judgment, see Weakland, Life
in the Third Circuit, PA. LAW., Oct. 1987, at 6.
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From the district courts' perspective, summary judgment can be
a blessed thing. For judges, summary judgment can eliminate many
of the hours spent presiding over cases in which litigants press hope-
less cases to juries. Summary judgment has the added benefits of
decreasing the judges' docket and providing the judges with the civil
law equivalent of swift execution of justice - the thrill of pulling
the plug on a terminal case. For litigants, the threat of summary
judgment offers some leverage for settlement before trial, as well as
the joy of striking fear into the heart of a weak opponent.19
Summary judgment becomes increasingly attractive to district
judgeq as their individual dockets increase. Studies abound on grow-
ing dockets and the resulting pressures on district judges.20 Perhaps
subconsciously feeling the need to adjudicate assiduously, district
court judges entered summary judgment at least 401 times in 1986
in derogation of the Rule 56 standard and the seventh amendment. 1
This is not meant to scourge the work of district judges. It is
recognized that judges have an innate desire to do justice and to do
it expeditiously. 2 If Litigant A has a losing case, the judge probably
will recognize the outcome before the jury renders its verdict. If Liti-
gant A has a losing case that will require a four week trial, the judge
will likely use all available measures to avoid belaboring the obvious
19. More recently, however, threats or summary judgment have probably become less
intimidating because of the widespread use of the motion in federal practice. The more threat-
ening motion in federal practice, and the motion in vogue among irritated litigants, is one for
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
20. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Sta-
tistics (Dec. 1986) (available in United States Courts of Appeals libraries); Van Dusen, Rand
Institute for Civil Justice 438 (1985) (available in Philadelphia County Bar Association
library).
21. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
22. About 340 B.C., the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, conceptualized justice as compen-
sation for wrong done and wrote:
The law never looks beyond the question, "What damage was done?" and it
treats the parties involved as equals. All it asks is whether an injustice has been
done or an injury inflicted by one party on the other. Consequently what the
judge seeks to do is to redress the inequality, which in this kind of justice is
identified with injustice . . . . What the judge aims at doing is to make the
parts equal by the penalty he imposes, whereby he takes from the aggressor any
gain he may have secured. The equal, then, is a mean between the more and the
less . . . . The equal, which we hold to be just, is now seen to be intermediate
between [gain and loss]. Hence, we conclude that corrective justice must be the
mean between loss and gain. This explains why the disputants have recourse to a
judge; for to go to a judge is to go to justice. The judge aims at being as it were
the incarnation of justice. Then, what men seek in a judge is a middle term-in
some societies the judges are actually called "mediators." People think that, if
they get the mean, they will get the just. Thus the just is in its way a mean, the
judge being, as we have seen, a mediating factor between the disputing parties.
What the judges does is to restore equality.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS BOOK FIVE, CHAPTER FOUR (Thompson trans. 1953).
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result.23 If Litigant B moves for summary judgment, the temptation
for the judge to avoid a protracted trial arises. Finally, if a summary
judgment motion is pending and all the evidence appears to favor
one side, then the Federal Rules and justice require the judge to
grant the motion for summary judgment.
In 1986, about one-third of federal appellate court cases dealt
with summary judgments.2 These are cases in which the district
judge could not resist the temptation to grant summary judgment
and in which the losing parties have absolutely nothing to show for
their efforts. Unlike settlements, some jury verdicts or appellate or-
ders of additur or remittitur, summary judgment does not represent
a compromise of claims. The losing party has only appellate review
as hope for vindication. 5
The finality of summary judgment and the real or imagined dif-
ficulty in having summary judgment upheld on appeal led the Su-
preme Court, in 1986, to rediscover Rule 56(e) and to force nonmov-
ing parties to meet the challenges presented by a new summary
judgment standard. In three cases, the Court gave district judges
enough precedential ammunition to shoot down cases by summary
judgment and keep them down. First, Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 6 allows courts to require that claimants
present more persuasive evidence to defeat summary judgment when
the factual context renders the claim implausible. Next, Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett27 places the burden of showing the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact on the nonmoving party, while the
moving party need only assert the basis of its motion. Finally, An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.2 8 requires the nonmoving party to pre-
23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 acknowledges the judge's role in fostering settle-
ment of civil cases. Rule 16(c)(7) encourages the litigants to "consider and take action with
respect to . . . the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute. ... The Honorable Frederick B. Lacey of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey suggests that 95 percent of civil case terminations should result from
counsels' efforts to settle with the judge's active participation: "1 believe the judge should
actively and firmly (but not coercively) seek to settle every case on his docket, then he should
'institutionalize,' if you will, the settlement conference. 1 suggest that no more than 5 percent
of each year's civil terminations should result from fully tried cases." Lacey, The Judge's Role
in the Settlement of Civil Suits, FED. JUD. CENTER, 4 (1977). See also Lambros, The Judge's
Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1363 (1983-84); Rude & Wall,
Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges and Lawyers View It, JUDICATURE, Oct.-
Nov. 1988, at 175.
24. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. This figure does not include criminal
and habeas corpus cases.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
26. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
27. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
28. 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). See also Holzberg, High Court Encourages Summary
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sent enough evidence at the summary judgment stage not only to
show a prima facie case, but to meet its burden of persuasion as
well. Together, these three cases represent a dramatic shift toward
more liberal use of summary judgment.29
B. The Matsushita, Celotex and Anderson Decisions
Although Matsushita, Celotex, and Anderson all pointed sum-
mary judgment standards in the movant's direction, the cases in-
volved widely disparate factual situations. Matsushita was an anti-
trust case brought by American manufacturers of electronic
products against a consortium of Japanese electronics manufactur-
ers.3" Celotex involved an occupational disease claim brought by a
widow against an asbestos manufacturer.31 Anderson involved a libel
claim brought by a self-proclaimed citizens' lobby against a maga-
zine.32 The only common threads in these cases appear to be the
relative weaknesses of plaintiffs' evidence and the presence of sum-
mary judgment motions.
Of the three decisions, perhaps Matsushita best represents the
future course of summary judgment. Similar to most antitrust cases,
Matsushita required the collection and analysis of a wide array of
factual material demonstrating a conspiracy and an anti-competitive
motive. 3 The district court in Matsushita granted summary judg-
ment and the opinion consumed 221 pages.34 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed and the appellate district court opin-
ion ran sixty-nine pages.30 The Supreme Court was then presented
with a forty volume appendix "that is said to contain the essence of
the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Appeals
based their respective decisions."3 6 The Supreme Court's finding that
Judgments, LITIG. NEWS, Feb. 1988 at _; Wallance, Summary Judgment Ascending, Li-
TIG., Winter 1988, at 6.
29. See Weakland, supra note 18, at 9 (quoting Remarks of the Honorable John J.
Gibbons, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
30. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
31. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
32. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
33. Claims were brought under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986).
34. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981), revd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
35. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
36. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986).
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summary judgment against the American manufacturers was war-
ranted indicates that the mere compilation of relevant facts is not
sufficient to create an issue of material fact for trial.
Matsushita, however, is an important decision because of the
analytical approach utilized by the Court. The Court applied the evi-
dence and inferences therefrom to the claim presented to determine
whether the claim was plausible. The Matsushita approach demands
closer scrutiny.
Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Electric Corpo-
ration filed suit in 1974, alleging that twenty-one Japanese corpora-
tions conspired for more than twenty years to seize control of the
American market for so-called consumer electronic products (CEPs).
The complaint sought relief under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, Section 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916.11 The scheme
asserted was predatory pricing, which the Court defined as a below-
cost pricing policy by a single firm, having a dominant share of the
relevant market, in order to force competitors out of the market or to
deter potential entrants from entering.38 According to the American
manufacturers, the Japanese companies conspired to cut prices of
CEPs to drive the American manufacturers out of the American
market and then to set artificially high prices to cover earlier
losses.3 9
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a conspir-
acy to engage in predatory pricing constituted an antitrust violation
under the Sherman Act."' Further, the court found that genuine is-
sues of fact existed as to whether the Japanese companies formed a
conspiracy to seize control of the American market by cutting prices
in the United States while enjoying artificially high prices in Ja-
pan.4' The court's finding that predatory pricing, if proven, would be
a per se violation of the Sherman Act was not before the Supreme
Court on appeal.'2 The Supreme Court defined the issue as "whether
respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to
survive summary judgment."' 3
One might expect that the Supreme Court would embark on a
37. Id. at 578.
38. Id. at 584, n.8.
39. Id. at 584.
40. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 305-06, rev'd sub nor.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
41. Id.
42. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986).
43. Id.
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search for sufficient evidence to support the American manufactur-
ers' theory. Instead, despite forty volumes of evidence, the Court
largely considered the plausibility of predatory pricing as a success-
ful antitrust tactic. The Court's consideration of the evidence ad-
duced in opposition to summary judgment took a back seat to schol-
arly analysis of antitrust theory. For example, the Court discussed
the implications of formal agreements through Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry to fix minimum prices for CEPs
exported to the American market, expert opinion evidence that Japa-
nese companies absorbed losses as great as twenty-five percent in the
American market, and the five-company rule whereby each Japanese
company agreed to sell its products to only five American
distributors."
The Court challenged the plausibility of Zenith's theory. In so
doing, the Court discussed theses by noted antitrust scholars, which
showed that predatory pricing is a high risk tactic at best, one that is
rarely tried and rarely successful."5
The Court held that "if the factual context renders respondents'
claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no eco-
nomic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be neces-
sary."' "6 The Court noted that the antitrust claimant must show more
than ambiguous conduct that may be construed to infer intent to
44. Id. at 581.
45. The Court took judicial notice that, for a predatory pricing scheme to be rational,
"the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later mo-
nopoly profits, more than the losses suffered." Id. at 589. Quoting then-Professor Robert Bork,
the Court noted:
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the predator as well as his
victims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may
be a rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an investment in
future monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future undisturbed
profits (where rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, appropri-
ately discounted, must then exceed the present size of the losses.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 (1978); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.
LAW & ECON. 289, 295-97 (1980). The Court also cited an article by Judge Frank H. Easter-
brook, commenting on the Matsushita case, showing that presumably it would be impossible
for the Japanese manufacturers to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time. The
Court adopted Easterbrook's conclusion:
On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty years, far
longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. None should be
sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each firm's incentive to
shave price and expand its share of sales. The predation-recoupment story there-
fore does not make sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that
the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in the first place. They were just en-
gaged in hard competition.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 27 (1984).
46. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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conspire.17 The claimant must present evidence "that tends to ex-
clude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted indepen-
dently. ' 8 Pushing the standard for summary judgment ever so
slightly, the Court ruled that respondents "in this case . . ., must
show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the
competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that
could not have harmed respondents.""' Such a standard suggests
that an antitrust claimant must endure a two-stage summary judg-
ment review. First, the court considers the rationality of the claim
per se. Second, the court views the relevant evidence to determine if
the alleged conspiracy was reasonable under the circumstances. In
other words, the more likely the alleged conspiracy was to be suc-
cessful, the more likely a claimant will survive summary judgment.5"
Matsushita is a textbook example of how the new super sum-
mary judgment standard usurps the jury function. The opinion ap-
pears to be crafted not by a judge searching for an issue of fact for
trial, but by a panel of factfinders trying to determine a verdict. The
Court weighed and measured the evidence and stated:
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the
conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such a con-
spiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" with in-
terest. And because the alleged losses have accrued over the
course of two decades, the conspirators could well require a cor-
respondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining supracompetitive
prices in turn depends on the continued cooperation of the con-
spirators, on the inability of other would-be competitors to enter
the market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators' ability to
escape antitrust liability for their minimum price-fixing cartel.
Each of these factors weighs more heavily as the time needed to
recoup losses grows. If the losses have been substantial-as
would likely be necessary in order to drive out the competi-
tion-petitioners would most likely have to sustain their cartel
for years simply to break even."
47. Id. at 587-88, (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
48. 475 U.S. at 558 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
49. Id.
50. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592-93 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added). The Court also cited a law review article about the case that had
been written after the court of appeals decision. Id. at 592 n. 15 (citing Easterbrook, The Lim-
its of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984)). The article noted that 15 years of losses in the
American market by the Japanese would require a monopolizing cartel to last 30 years to
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Are these not the analytical processes that the Constitution in-
tends for a jury under the seventh amendment?52 Why should
judges, who are vested with no greater understanding of economic
theory than the remainder of society, obtain the task of sorting out
the plausible antitrust conspiracies from the implausible? In Matsu-
shita, could not a reasonable jury have found an antitrust violation
on the basis of the Japanese companies' documented agreement that
governed marketing strategies and prices in the United States?
Would the decision be altered if the Japanese manufacturers were
gaining an increasing share of the CEP market following the deci-
sion of the Court? Would the verdict change if the plaintiff could
prove that because of rapid technological advances inherent in the
industry later entrants to the monopolized market would be unable
to provide competitive products? As Justice White pointed out in his
dissent in Matsushita, the plausibility of the alleged scheme should
have been determined by a jury because the evidence presented a
genuine issue of material fact.5"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett54 presented a more basic procedural
issue: the placement of burdens of proof upon the summary judg-
ment movant and respondent. In Celotex, the wife-plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action against a number of asbestos manufacturers,
claiming that her husband's death resulted from exposure to the
manufacturers' products.5 5 During discovery, the plaintiff neither
identified any Celotex products in her answers to interrogatories, nor
did she provide witnesses who could place a Celotex asbestos product
at her husband's worksite.56 Celotex moved for summary judgment
because Mrs. Catrett failed to produce evidence that any Celotex
product was the proximate cause of her husband's injuries.57
recoup its losses with higher prices. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1,
27 (1984). The article concluded: "The predation-recoupment story therefore does not make
sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell
below cost in the first place." Id. at 26-27, n.45. Note, however, that expert opinion of record
is to the contrary. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 311
(1983), rev'd sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
52. One issue not articulated by the Court, but which may have been at the heart of its
mission of justice, was whether a consortium of Japanese electronics manufacturers would be
treated fairly by an American jury.
53. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 599 (White, J., dissenting).
54. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
55. The custom in asbestos and other occupational disease cases is that the claimant
sues the panoply of asbestos manufacturers whose products the claimant or other workers can
identify as having been on the jobsite.
56. 477 U.S. at 320.
57. Id. at 319-20.
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In response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
Mrs. Catrett produced three documents that she claimed "demon-
strate[d] that there is a genuine material factual dispute" as to
whether the decedent had ever been exposed to Celotex asbestos
products.58 The documents included decedent's deposition transcript,
a letter from a former employer, and a letter from an insurance com-
pany to Celotex.59 In turn, Celotex argued that the documents were
inadmissible hearsay and could not be used to defeat a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment.60
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia ruled that Celotex's motion was fatally de-
fective because Celotex made no effort to discover evidence support-
ing its motion.6 1 In other words, Celotex had the burden of present-
ing facts demonstrating that decedent did not use its asbestos
products. The court of appeals held that the summary judgment mo-
vant was required to put forward evidence to prove lack of a genuine
issue of material fact.62
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56, once the movant makes a motion, he need not
adduce evidence showing proof of a lack of a material fact issue.63
The Court held:
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
...[W]e find no express or implied requirement in Rule
56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or
other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.6 4
58. Id. at 320.
59. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 320 (1986).
60. Id.
61. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
62. Id. at 184.
63. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
64. Id. at 322-23 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The court of appeals in Washington v.
Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988), cited Celotex and stated that
a "complete failure of proof on an essential element renders all other facts immaterial because
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The Court's underlying rationale was that the claimant bears the
ultimate burden of proving its claim. To require the non-claimant to
adduce evidence in order to escape liability is to place improperly the
burden of proof upon the defending party. 5 Thus, the burden re-
mains with the claimant. If the movant chooses to buttress its motion
with affidavits, admissions, or other discovery evidence, the burden
does not shift to the claimant, but perhaps simply has intensified
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e).1
On the same day Celotex was decided by the Supreme Court,
the Court ruled that when the nonmoving party is the claimant, it
must respond with additional evidence to defeat a summary judg-
ment motion if it bears a greater burden at trial.67 In Anderson, the
Court held that a trial judge pondering a summary judgment motion
must consider the "actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to
support liability" when determining whether the claimant's proffered
evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact."
In Anderson, a publisher and his magazine were sued for libel
by a self-proclaimed citizen's lobby." According to the Court, the
publication portrayed Liberty Lobby "as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, ra-
cist, and Fascist."'7 0 The defendants moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that the plaintiffs were public figures, that the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan71 standard of actual malice was applica-
ble, and that, as a matter of law, actual malice was absent. 72 In sup-
port of their motion, the defendants submitted an affidavit from the
articles' author listing the source of every alleged libelous state-
ment.73 In response, plaintiffs presented evidence that several sources
there is no longer an issue of material fact" remaining for trial. The non-moving party, of
course, is charged with the burden of proof as to that essential element. See also George v.
Parke-Davis, 684 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Wash. 1988).
65. 477 U.S. at 324.
66. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) places the risk upon the nonmovant when it
rests upon the mere allegations of its pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317,
330 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court remanded Celotex after it found
that Celotex's motion was facially adequate. Id. at 328. On remand, Catrett v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the record contained sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether plaintiff's
decedent was exposed to a Celotex asbestos product. 826 F.2d at 39-40. Judge Bork dissented,
stating that the element of causation was not satisfied by plaintiff's evidence, and that the
plaintiff's proffered evidence was inadmissible and could not be considered under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(e). Id. at 41-42 (Bork, J., dissenting).
67. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id. at 244-45.
70. Id. at 245.
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 245 (1986).
73. Id.
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were unreliable, that the information was not verified prior to publi-
cation, and that another editor of the magazine considered the arti-
cles terrible and ridiculous.""
The Court recognized that a public figure suing for libel must
present a greater degree of proof than necessary for a run-of-the-mill
civil case.7 The public figure must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the publisher knew the statements to be false or acted
with reckless disregard for their truthfulness. 7 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, the nonmoving party must present evidence showing rea-
sonable potential to meet the higher level of proof.7" According to
the Court, the trial court should view summary judgment motions
through a substantial level of proof prism when the claimant faces
higher evidentiary burdens.
78
Lest trial courts believe they have free reign to make quality
and quantity determinations of the evidence, the Court adopted lan-
guage to create some pause. For example, the Court stated that evi-
dence may be "so one-sided that a party must prevail as a matter of
law," but the judge "must ask himself not whether he thinks the
evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other."'79 The Court
also noted that the trial judge may consider the insufficient caliber or
quantity of evidence, but may not usurp jury functions, including
"[c]redibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and the draw-
ing of legitimate inferences from the facts."80 Anderson sets forth
the following murky test for use by trial courts: for summary judg-
ment to be merited, the claimant must not have produced a sufficient
quantity of evidence (don't do any weighing) nor evidence of suffi-
cient quality (please, no inferences or credibility assessments) to
withstand the appropriate burden of proof (not sufficient for you, but
sufficient for a rational jury).8 "
74. Id. at 246.
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id.
77. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1986).
78. Id. at 254.
79. Id. at 252.
80. Id. at 255.
81. Anderson also held that the standard for summary judgment is identical to the stan-
dard for directed verdict under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a): the trial judge must direct a verdict if,
under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If reasonable minds could differ as to
the import of the evidence, a verdict should not be directed. Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320
U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Cf. Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985) (even when a directed verdict would be appropriate
after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court should not try the case in advance by summary
judgment).
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Matsushita, Celotex, and Anderson combine to form a powerful
new direction for summary judgment. Celotex requires the plaintiff
to come forward with evidence before trial upon a mere motion by
the defendant.8 Matsushita requires that the evidence be sufficient
to render the plaintiff's claim plausible. 83 Anderson allows the trial
court to enter judgment if the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
not sufficient, under the applicable standard of proof, to permit a
The difficulty with this comparison lies in the timing of the two motions. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a summary judgment motion may be made at any time
after the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action. A directed verdict motion is
made at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 56(a). The
Court in Anderson now tells litigants to package their evidence into documentary form so that
all of it can be placed before a court deciding a summary judgment action. The result: testimo-
nial evidence must be converted to affidavits, although the Anderson court stated that the
summary judgment standard "by no means authorizes trial on affidavits." Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255. A question for the Court: by what other means can the nonmovant place all of its
evidence before the trial court? Cf. Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289
(8th Cir. 1988) ("court may grant summary judgment where a party's sudden and unex-
plained revision of testimony creates an issue of fact where none existed before"; affidavit
contradicted deposition).
Judge Edward R. Becker, in his concurrence in J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity
Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1987), recognized the timing issue raised by Celotex and
Anderson:
[lit is quite likely that, when a complaint is first filed-or amended to set out a
new theory of liability-a plaintiff will indeed lack enough evidence to get to a
jury on every element. But we would not want to end the case because the plain-
tiff has not then adduced sufficient evidence. We would instead want to permit
the plaintiff to go forward with the discovery he believes necessary, and only put
him to his proofs after he has had the opportunity to develop them.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not recognize this timing problem in Anderson.
In Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1988), the
court held that a claim of future discovery of facts not then known by the nonmovant is insuffi-
cient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
however, stated that "a party must have an adequate opportunity to develop his claims
through discovery before summary judgment is appropriate. ... Redmond v. Burlington N.
R.R. Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 461, 469 (8th Cir. 1987). Cf. Continental Maritime, Inc. v.
Pacific Coast Metal Trades, AFL-CIO, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court did not
abuse discretion in denying additional time for discovery); Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816
F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1987) (nonmoving party has burden of showing how additional time and
discovery will allow him to rebut movant's allegations); Garrett v. City & County of San
Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1987) (trial court may continue motion for summary judg-
ment if nonmovant needs to discover additional facts).
Although the Court held in Anderson that summary judgment and directed verdict stan-
dards are alike and their difference is one of timing, at least one lower court has held that
Rule 12(b)(1) motions enjoy the same standard. In Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft
Indus., 813 F.2d 1553 (9th Cir. 1987), the court ruled that a nonmoving party is required to
present evidence outside its pleadings in opposition to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the burden upon ihe nonmovant in such a motion is the same as
that required under Rule 56(e) and set forth under Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita. Id. at
1558. One wonders whether the courts are moving toward one standard for all pre-verdict
motions questioning the sufficiency of proof. The Federal Civil Procedure Rules Committee is
considering a rule to merge Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, in order to place more emphasis on
critical fact pleading. Weakland, supra note 18, at 9.
82. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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reasonable jury to return a verdict in plaintiff's favor.84 Although the
Court maintained that the province of the jury has not been deni-
grated by these decisions, it is evident that the trial judge now has
greater precedential support for entering summary judgment in one-
sided cases.8"
C. Application of the New Summary Judgment Standards
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. can be cited for a variety of
legal propositions. In Metzger v. Osbeck,86 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit employed the generally accepted strict view of
summary judgment motions, citing Anderson for the proposition that
the Judge's role "is not himself to weigh the evidence and deter-
mine the truth of the matter," but to determine whether the evi-
dence creates a genuine issue of material fact which, "because
[it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," "prop-
erly can be resolved only by a finder of fact."
'87
The court, however, adopted the softer Anderson approach, noting
that summary judgment may be granted when the evidence is "so
one-sided that . . . [the defendant] must prevail as a matter of
law. ''88 This softer standard was accompanied by the caveat Chat
a court should be reluctant to grant a motion for summary judg-
ment when resolution of the dispositive issue requires a determi-
nation of state of mind, for in such cases much depends upon the
credibility of witnesses testifying as to their own states of mind,
and assessing credibility is a delicate matter best left to the fact
finder.8"
Questions of intent usually prevent summary judgment. Intent
typically becomes a crucial factor in recovering damages in employ-
ment discrimination and libel cases. In recent years, courts have ap-
84. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
85. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
86. 841 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 519 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).
88. Id. at 521 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
89. Id. (quoting Watts v. University of Del., 622 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1980). Metzger v.
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1988), held that summary judgment is not appropriate when
questions of intent are raised. The court noted that a defendant should not escape liability
simply by stating that he did not intend to perform the alleged intentional act. Id. at 521. See
Crawford v. LaBoucheire Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 328 (1987) (a court may find intent in ruling on a summary judgment motion when that
intent "may be inferred from objective facts," even though state of mind is usually a jury
question). Id. at 122-23. See also Three Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
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plied the newly articulated standards for summary judgment in these
two areas. In employment discrimination cases, recovery generally
hinges upon the employer's motivation in discharging the em-
ployee.9 0 In libel cases, intent is implied in actual malice, since a
defamatory statement must be made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard for its truth."
During the course of litigation, courts usually will enter sum-
mary judgment at three different stages. First, summary judgment
may be entered on the basis of certain threshold matters, such as
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of in personam jurisdiction,
statute of limitations, standing, and lack of proper venue.92 In these
circumstances, the new summary judgment standards have not al-
tered courts' traditional views and approaches. The second category
of summary judgment situations, which is more fact specific, consid-
ers threshold issues pertaining to the stated claim. For example, in
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) cases, for a de-
fendant to be considered an employer, it must employ twenty or
more employees for twenty or more weeks during the relevant time
period.93 Courts may easily decide such precise threshold questions
on motions for summary judgment.94 The third category upon which
the new summary judgment standards impact deals with ultimate
fact issues and the quality and quantity of evidence.95 In such cases,
the court considers the evidence presented and determines whether
the proof is so one-sided that a rational jury could reach but one
conclusion.96 When the evidence is two-sided, however, summary
judgment is not appropriate. 7
1. Employment Discrimination Cases.-Perhaps no field of
90. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1987); Ballin-
ger v. North Carolina Agricultural Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 232 (1987); Carey v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621 (10th Cir.
1987). Summary judgment may also be entered when the claimant does not follow statutory
time limits for the filing of a court action. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
91. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Jenkins v. KYW, 829 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1987).
92. See In re Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 833 (3d Cir. 1988); Volk v. D.A.
Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987); Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft
Indus., 813 F.2d F.2d 1553, 1558-59 (9th Cir. 1987).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985).
94. Claims involving facial challenges to statutes or regulations are also appropriate for
summary judgment treatment. IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988).
Suits on notes can typically be decided on summary judgment. FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well
Servicing Co., 837 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1988).
95. This is the Matsushita type of summary judgment.
96. See supra notes 33-51 & 67-81 and accompanying text.
97. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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law is as susceptible to summary judgment controversies as employ-
ment discrimination. From threshold matters to ultimate fact issues,
employment discrimination litigants often find themselves litigating
summary judgment motions. In Martin v. United Way,98 the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a trial court's grant of
summary judgment in an ADEA and Title VII 99 case. The district
court granted United Way's motion for summary judgment reason-
ing that the organization was not engaged in an "industry affecting
commerce," and that United Way was not an "employer" since it
did not employ twenty or more employees for twenty or more weeks
during the relevant years.1 ° Although each basis was a threshold
matter, the court held that issues of fact remained for trial. 1 Pre-
sumably, the jury would decide these issues.' 02
The ultimate question of liability in employment discrimination
cases also has been challenged on summary judgment. An examina-
tion of these cases is interesting because the results reflect individual
court's philosophies toward such claims, and because of the peculiar
burden-shifting that occurs both before and during trial.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"3 the Supreme Court
announced a three-prong, burden-shifting test to evaluate employ-
ment discrimination claims.' 4 First, the plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.10 This is established in ADEA cases by showing that the
claimant (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for the
position; (3) was dismissed despite being qualified; and (4) ulti-
mately was replaced by a person sufficiently younger to permit an
inference of age discrimination.' Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
98. 829 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1987).
99. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended by, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1981).
100. Martin v. United Way, 829 F.2d 445, 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
101. But see Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987) (as a matter of law a
general partner in an accounting firm was not an employee entitled to bring suit under
ADEA).
102. Federal criminal statutes generally require that the alleged criminal act affect in-
terstate commerce. In criminal trials, a prosecutor can only gain a conviction upon proving the
interstate element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Hobbs Anti-Racketeering
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982); Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982); Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1962 (1982).
103. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
104. Id. at 802.
105. Id.
106. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986).
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articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection.0 7 Third, if the defendant meets this burden, the
plaintiff has an opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.' 0 8 Lower courts
have uniformly engaged in this three-prong analysis when ruling on
a motion for summary judgment. 09
Courts have granted summary judgment motions when employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case. In Barnes v. Southwest Forest
Indus.," 0 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that six
security guard plaintiffs failed to prove a prima facie case even
though the plaintiffs demonstrated that the employer hired younger
employees without giving the older plaintiff employees an opportu-
nity to compete for those jobs."' The court, adding a new element to
the four prima facie factors, held that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that they were actually available to take those jobs."' Simi-
larly, in Ballinger v. North Carolina Agricultural Extension
Serv.," 3 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment entered against a fifty-five-year-old woman who as-
serted claims of gender and age discrimination." 4 The woman had
applied for a position as county chairman of an agricultural exten-
sion service, but the position was filled by her co-worker at the ser-
vice, a thirty-four-year-old man. 1 5 A screening committee for the
county commissioners recommended both workers for the position.""
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case
for age or sex discrimination because she and her co-worker were
both recommended for the promotion."
17
Summary judgment also has been entered when a court finds
that a plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to show that an
107. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
108. Id. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
109. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638-39 (5th
Cir. 1985); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1984).
110. 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987).
111. Id. at 610-11.
112. Id. at 610. The court's holding, however, is based on a fact issue more properly left
to the jury, perhaps suggesting a philosophy about the quality of proof needed to reach a jury
in ADEA cases in the Eleventh Circuit.
113. 815 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 232 (1987).
114. Id. at 1003.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1004.
117. Id. at 1005. The issues surrounding the dual recommendation to the commissioners
and the eventual decision to hire the younger man were not sent to the jury.
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employer's justification for an employment decision was a pretext to
age discrimination. In Dea v. Look,'18 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed an entry of summary judgment for the em-
ployer because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence rebutting
the employer's explanation for plaintiff's discharge. According to the
employer, the plaintiff wrongfully used the employer's fuel." 9 The
court, however, did not consider, as adequate rebuttal evidence, that
another employee, who also wrongfully used the gasoline, was rein-
stated to his job with back pay.1
2
1
In Carey v. United States Postal Serv.,12' the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, using the Supreme Court's three-prong analy-
sis, examined a Title VII claim and determined that the plaintiff
offered no evidence demonstrating that the employer's decision to
award a supervisor position to a black employee was reverse discrim-
ination .12 The employer's proffered reason for choosing the black
employee was an obligation pursuant to a settlement agreement
reached in a prior Title VII case.123
By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit almost
routinely denies summary judgment motions in employment discrim-
ination cases. In Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,1 2 an employer al-
legedly terminated a fifty-eight-year-old manager due to a cutback
in expenses and a moratorium on the construction of more stores for
the employer.125 The employer also claimed that the plaintiff was
terminated because of his indifferent, uncooperative, and ineffective
attitude regarding certain special projects of the employer. 26 Never-
theless, a forty-three-year-old man subsequently assumed the plain-
tiff's duties and his title. 27 The court noted .hat the plaintiff had
met his prima facie burden. 2 8 The court then placed the following
burden upon an employer moving for summary judgment: "[T]o
meet its burden on summary judgment, the defendant employer
must show that the plaintiff wil! be unable to introduce either direct
118. 810 F.2d 12 (Ist Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id.
121. 812 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 624.
123. Id. at 624. The court distinguished Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) on the ground that the Postal Service did not implement any affirmative action or
hiring quota systems. Carey, 812 F.2d at 625.
124. 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
125. Id. at 895,
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 898.
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evidence of a purpose to discriminate, or indirect evidence of that
purpose by showing that the proffered reason is subject to factual
dispute."129Thus, the plaintiff need not come forward with evidence
at the summary judgment stage to show that the employer's reasons
for termination were pretextual unless the defendant can demon-
strate the plaintiff's inability to present such evidence. Although, this
may be a subtle distinction, the standard indicates that the Third
Circuit does not employ the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test
to overcome the usual summary judgment burden standard. In the
Third Circuit, the burden remains with the movant on summary
judgment.13 °
2. Libel Suits.-Another fertile ground for summary judg-
ment disposition is libel litigation. Anderson was a libel case. 31 The
Anderson Court ruled that in cases involving public officials or pub-
lic figures, the nonmoving plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts to
show that he or she can meet the actual malice standard at trial. 32
Recent libel case law demonstrates that libel plaintiffs must come
forward with substantial evidence showing actual malice by the de-
fendant to avoid summary judgment.
129. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.'Ct. 26 (1987).
130. Other Third Circuit cases showing a restrictive view of summary judgment for em-
ployment discrimination claimants include: Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200
(3d Cir. 1987) (summary judgment was reversed because the record contained "evidence of
inconsistencies and implausibilities in the employer's proffered reasons for discharge [which]
reasonably could support an inference that the employer did not act for [those] nondiscrimina-
tory reasons."); see also White v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp,, 862 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1988);
Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 732
(1988); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1987); E.E.O.C. v. City of
Mount Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1988). But see Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860
F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988). The Healy court affirmed summary judgment for the employer and
stated:
[w]e emphasize that, despite the breadth of the language in Chipollini, discrimi-
nation cases are inherently fact-bound. Certainly Chipollini does not stand for
the proposition that summary judgment is never available in discrimination ac-
tions. Rather, we understand the teaching of Chipollini to be that where plain-
tiffs proffer evidence of pretext and create a genuine issue of material fact as to
the credibility of the employer's "legitimate" business reasons, summary judg-
ment is foreclosed.
Id. at 1219.
For a more comprehensive review of the new summary judgment standard as applied to
employment discrimination cases, see John v. Jansonius, The Role of Summary Judgment in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 4 LAB. LAW. 747-95 (Fall 1988).
131. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
132. Id.; cf. Zerange v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1987) (a non-
movant must prove actual malice with convincing clarity at the summary judgment stage)
(citing Anderson).
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Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc."3' presents a typical sum-
mary judgment disposition in a post-Anderson libel case. In Saenz, a
New Mexico Department of Corrections secretary sued Playboy for
libel based on a March 1981 article in Playboy Magazine entitled
"Thirty-Six Hours at Santa Fe.'" 34 The article recalled the plain-
tiff's earlier career as a U.S. Government official in Uruguay and
Panama and stated, inter alia, that "allegations of torture by his po-
lice clients would follow Saenz through subsequent assignments in
Columbia and Panama" and that "[Saenz] had intimate and influen-
tial relations with Uruguayan police.
135
To oppose Playboy's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of actual malice, the plaintiff produced a letter that the Playboy re-
porter had written to his agent describing Saenz as a "State of Siege
character, with his career in Latin torture chambers . ". .., The
court, however, held that this letter was not sufficient to raise a jury
question of actual malice by the reporter or the publication.1 37 The
court stated:
Although it might not be unreasonable to believe that this rather
ambiguous statement demonstrates a belief that Saenz was a
torturer, it alone could hardly constitute clear and convincing
evidence that the defendants knew or intended the defamatory
inference that might now be drawn from their publication ....
At best, the statement is indirect evidence from which no more
than a mere suggestion of culpability may be drawn. The letter
does not state that Saenz was himself involved in torture. Nor
was the statement written contemporaneously with the article or
included in the text of the publication itself. Though relevant to
the issue of malice, when considered in light of the clear and
convincing evidence Saenz must ultimately produce, this one let-
ter, standing alone, is insufficient to require a jury to resolve the
plaintiff's claimed factual dispute. Charged as we believe we are
with considering "the 'quantum' of proof required and ...
whether the evidence is of sufficient 'caliber or quality' to meet
that 'quantum' " . . . we conclude that a reasonable jury could
not find that Saenz established actual malice by clear and con-
vincing evidence.a'
133. 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
134. Id. at 1311.
135. Id. at 1312.
136. Id. at 1319.
137. Id.
138. Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Anderson).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
Given the holding that a smoking gun letter is insufficient to
raise a jury question as to the defendants' actual malice or reckless
disregard of the truth, one may wonder what level of proof libel
plaintiffs must produce to defeat a summary judgment motion. Ac-
cording to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, actual malice
questions can be presented to the jury if the publisher defendant has
"obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accu-
racy of his reports." '139 In Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time,
Inc., 4" the court reminded district courts to view the evidence
through the prism of the Anderson summary judgment standard:
Even though the standard for actual malice is difficult to meet,
and even though it must be met by clear and convincing evi-
dence, we nonetheless must not lose sight of the fact that we
must decide this question on summary judgment. On summary
judgment,. . . "[t]he non-movant's allegations must be taken as
true and, when these assertions conflict with those of the mo-
vant, the former must receive the benefit of the doubt." 14
Questions still remain about the quantum of proof necessary to
139. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1090 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting
St. Armant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
140. 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 1090 (quoting Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977)). While the Third Circuit tends to give the benefit
of the doubt to the nonmovant, two Third Circuit cases have held that a defendant was enti-
tled to summary judgment when the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of actual
malice. In Jenkins v. KYW, 829 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1987), a television broadcast described a
Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court judge as entering an unconscionably light sentence
to a convicted killer, only to have the criminal commit another murder while on probation. The
assistant district attorney expressed opinions during the television broadcast relating to judge's
sentencing obligations. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant stating that:
We discern no evidence which, by a clear and convincing standard, would show
that the defendant had serious doubts about the truthfulness of the broadcast.
The plaintiff has not shown that the investigation by the television reporters dis-
closed the falsity of a statement at issue, nor that they entertained serious doubt
as to any statement's truth. Moreover, many of the allegedly defamatory state-
ments are clearly opinions. These opinions, however biting, are protected by the
First Amendment.
Id. at 407.
In Dunn v. Gannett N.Y. Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir., 1987), an Elizabeth,
New Jersey, mayor sued a local Spanish newspaper. Following the mayor's speech lamenting
the local Hispanic population as litterbugs, the newspaper stated that the mayor called His-
panics "cerdos," which translated into English means "pigs." The mayor argued that his repu-
tation in the community was harmed by the headline: "Alcalde de Elizabeth al Ataque:
LLAMA 'CERDOS' A LOS HISPANOS," which translated into English means "Elizabeth
Mayor on the attack: CALLS HISPANICS 'PIGS.' " The mayor argued that actual malice
should be implied because the defendant knew that the headline was an exaggeration of the
truth. The court held that the mayor did not produce sufficient evidence to show actual malice.
The mayor's remarks about Hispanics could not easily be translated because there is no word
for "litterbug" in Spanish. Id. at 448-51.
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defeat libel summary judgment motions. It is clear, however, that a
nonmovant must present some facts to support a claim that actual
malice existed.142 A mere assertion that a reasonable jury would not
believe the defendant's denial of actual malice is insufficient to avoid
summary judgment. 143 Nevertheless, the raising of the issue of ac-
tual malice at the summary judgment stage seems to have surpassed
the defense of truth as the best way for libel defendants to extricate
themselves from such lawsuits.'
44
Circuit Judge Bork, expressing disdain for the litigiousness of
one libel plaintiff, applied the Anderson summary judgment standard
in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.1'5 A publisher filed
a libel suit following the publication of a Wall Street Journal article
that connected the publisher with an American Nazi group.' 46 Judge
Bork was particularly disturbed because only two weeks after the
Supreme Court held that the Anderson article was not the product
of actual malice, Liberty Lobby, the plaintiff in Anderson, sued an-
other publication for libel arising out of a story based on essentially
the same sources as in Anderson. 47
142. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times, Co., 842 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1988)
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988). A New York Times article examined a Westport, Con-
necticut, religion whose priests had the trappings of wealth by operating a large, tax-exempt
mail order business. The court held that "[ojur independent review of the record reveals no
indication of clear and convincing evidence that the Times acted with actual malice." Id. at
622. See also Flotech, Inc. v. E. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987).
143. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times, Co., 842 F.2d 612, 622-23
(1988).
144. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1986).
145. 838 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988).
146. Id. at 1290.
147. The court stated that:
This suit epitomizes one of the most troubling aspects of modern libel litiga-
tion: the use of [the] libel complaint as a weapon to harass. Despite the patent
insufficiency of a number of appellant's claims, it has managed to embroil a
media defendant in over three years of costly and contentious litigation. The
message to this defendant and the press at large is clear: discussion of Liberty
Lobby is expensive. However well-documented a story, however unimpeachable a
reporter's source, he or she will have to think twice about publishing where liti-
gation, even to a successful motion for summary judgment, can be very expen-
sive if not crippling. We have conducted an independent review of the record in
this case, and have found that each of appellant's claims is clearly barred on
several common law and constitutional grounds.
Id. at 1303. The court also noted that:
Liberty Lobby has brought a number of libel suits against media defendants
that have characterized it as racially prejudiced or anti-Semitic. See, e.g., Dall
v. Pearson, 246 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1963), affd, C.A. No. 18, 414 (D.C.Cir.
Oct. 22, 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965, 85 S. Ct. 1108, 14 L.Ed.2d 155
(1965) (libel suit based on columnist's statements that Liberty Lobby's congres-
sional testimony was an "anti-Semitic diatribe" and "an attack on the Jews");
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F.Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983), aff d in part,
rev'd in part, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C.Cir. 1984), rev'd in part, 477 U.S. 242, 106
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3. Antitrust Litigation.-Antitrust law also plays host to nu-
merous motions for summary judgment, especially following the lib-
eral summary judgment standard established in Matsushita.148 Anti-
trust cases often generate a great volume of documents and
information, some important and some needless, making a court's
decision to enter summary judgment a difficult one. In this area, the
individual philosophies of the courts of appeals can be outcome de-
terminative. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit favors
summary disposition in antitrust litigation.149 The court held that
[t]he very nature of antitrust litigation would encourage sum-
mary disposition of such cases when permissible. Not only do
antitrust trials often encompass a great deal of expensive and
time-consuming discovery and trial work, but also . . . the stat-
utory private antitrust remedy of treble damages affords a spe-
cial temptation for the institution of vexatious litigation ....
The ultimate determination, after trial, that an antitrust claim is
unfounded, may come too late to guard against the evils that
occur along the way.15
Although such language may dissuade potential plaintiffs from
filing antitrust suits in the Seventh Circuit, antitrust plaintiffs are
less inhibited in the Ninth Circuit. In Three Movies of Tarzana v.
Pacific Theatres, Inc., 51 the court held that "[s]ummary judgment
is disfavored in complex antitrust litigation if extensive factual deter-
minations must be made concerning intent and motive . . . .How-
ever, it is appropriate in the absence of any significant probative evi-
dence tending to support the complaint."'' 2 Meanwhile, the Court of
S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (libel suit based upon magazine's statements
that Liberty Lobby was "anti-Semitic" and "infiltrated by Nazis"); Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. National Review, Inc., No. 79-3445, (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 1982) (libel
action based on The National Review's characterization of Liberty Lobby as "a
hotbed of anti-Semitism"); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 667 F. Supp. I (D.D.C.
1986) (libel action based on characterization of Liberty Lobby as racist and
anti-Semitic); Carto v. Buckley, 649 F.Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (libel action
based on charge that the "distinctive feature" of Liberty Lobby publication, The
Spotlight, is "racial and religious bigotry"). None of these suits has been suc-
cessful and in no instance has Liberty Lobby been allowed to present its claims
to a jury.
Id. at 1303 n.9.
148. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1976).
149. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 488 (1987).
150. Id. at 660 n.4 (citing Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
151. Three Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1028 (1988).
152. Id. at 1398 (citations omitted).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL PRACTICE
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that restraint of trade allegations
must be supported by "significant probative evidence" in order to
overcome a motion for summary judgment.
153
The Matsushita approach to motions for summary judgment in
the antitrust context emphasizes placing before the court credible,
hard evidence of an antitrust violation. For example, in Pocahontas
Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,54 the complaint al-
leged that various parent companies had conspired to control coal
production and pricing by deputizing persons to sit on boards of
competing subsidiaries, thereby creating an interlocking director-
ate.1 55 The plaintiff brought suit under Section 8 of the Clayton
Act. 5 The complaint did not identify the names of the directors on
the various boards involved in the alleged deputization scheme.1
57
The court stated that "no evidence was proffered that particular per-
sons sat on the boards of corporations shown, rather than merely
alleged in conclusory terms, to be competitors in the required statu-
tory sense. The ambiguous allegation that certain persons were 'of-
ficers and/or directors' of competing companies remained ambiguous
on the critical point."' 5 8 Finding no evidence to support the allega-
tion, the court affirmed the lower court, stating:
We think that the district court rightly adjudged that de-
spite adequate opportunity to put a forecast of hard proof of its
§ 8 claim on the line, Pocahontas had not done so. In those cir-
cumstances a court need not withhold summary judgment, even
in complicated cases such as antitrust, simply because there may
remain "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."...
The burden cast upon Pocahontas was to come forward with
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); it could not at this point rely only on its
conclusory pleading allegations to hold the case at issue ....
The district court rightly perceived that on no more hard evi-
dence than Pocahontas had put in the record no rational trier of
fact, properly instructed in the substantive law and on the bur-
den of proof, could find for Pocahontas on its § 8 claim, and that
summary judgment was therefore appropriate.' 59
153. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 644
(10th Cir. 1987).
154. 828 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1987).
155. Id. at 215.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
157. Pocahantas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 217 (4th
Cir. 1987).
158. Id. at 217.
159. Id. (citing Matsushita). Accord Alberta Gas Chems. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours,
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It appears that courts hesitate to draw many inferences from
the evidence in antitrust cases, although inferences are frequently
drawn by courts in employment discrimination cases.160 One possible
explanation is that the Supreme Court, in Matsushita, instructed
trial courts to make factual determinations based on some concep-
tion of logic."6' Another explanation is that courts do not want to
become entangled in the complex details of antitrust evidence, as in-
dicated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach. 62 In any event, the summary disposition of antitrust cases
has gained popularity since Matsushita.
III. Summary Judgment Model - Epistemic Coherence
Super summary judgment, the standard employed in Matsu-
shita and to some extent in Anderson and Celotex, has given federal
district courts a license to look beyond the evidence of record and
impose the courts' own beliefs based on outside information or stud-
ies when ruling on summary judgment motions.'63 In effect, courts
are free to draw upon their own gathered evidence in addition to
evidence adduced by the parties. Unfortunately, the adversarial clash
of the parties cannot challenge these outside sources because courts
introduce such evidence at the decision-making stage. Although
courts have an interest in judicial efficiency and docket control, these
interests must be weighed against concern for not only our adver-
sarial system of justice, but also the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial in civil cases. The basic premise in the Anglo-American
system of justice is that the truth will emerge from the adversarial
clash of the parties. Given Matsushita and its progeny, one wonders
whether truth now emerges solely from judicial cogitation. 4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not require courts to
seek the truth when ruling. Truth-seeking, like fact-finding, is within
the province of the jury. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has led
lower courts away from the fundamental standard embodied in Rule
56, which is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830 (1987) (summary judgment up-
held because the plaintiff failed to set forth specific facts showing an injury on a claim under §
7 of Clayton Act). See also Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1988).
160. See supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., supra note 45 and accompanying text.
164. Because courts of appeals, in published opinions, affirm less than sixty percent of
summary judgment cases, the truth, as pronounced by judges, is not always "nothing but the
truth." See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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remains for trial. The rule, as explained in Celotex,' 65 requires that
the parties produce evidence before trial to show that a trial is neces-
sary. 16 The truth does not emerge in the pre-trial phase of litigation.
The only question is whether the parties need to proceed through the
trial process. Because the judge is not (and should not be) a fact-
finder in the summary judgment stage,16 7 a court cannot discover the
truth, nor should it try to, when ruling upon a motion for summary
judgment. Facts or truths can only emerge through the adversarial
process during trial. 6 8
At the summary judgment stage, the judge only needs to deter-
mine whether a material fact issue remains for a fact-finder at trial.
Although this task sounds relatively easy in the context of a lawsuit,
courts and litigators, who cannot focus on precise issues of material
fact without muddying the resolution with extraneous or irrelevant
evidence, have complicated its execution.
Once courts reject attempts to seek the truth at the summary
judgment stage, they will be more likely to avoid considering extra-
neous evidence in determining whether any genuine issue of fact re-
mains for trial. In addition, the court must intensely scrutinize the
interplay of the remaining evidence. Does the proffered evidence log-
ically fit together to form a coherent picture favoring the summary
judgment movant? Or is there evidence that tarnishes the movant's
position to such a degree that a fact-finder is needed to arrive at the
truth? This should be the court's mental process when ruling upon a
motion for summary judgment, as required by Rule 56. This is also
the classical cognitive approach known as "epistemic coherence." 6 9
Epistemology is the study of the structure of knowledge and be-
liefs. °0 Every belief or any knowledge a person possesses can be
based on a number of inductive inferences gained through sensory
perception or by some other means. 1  One scientist breaks down
165. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
166. Id. at 323-24.
167. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
168. One may argue that facts or truths emerge at the summary judgment stage be-
cause the law recognizes that certain issues can be settled, or facts may be ascertained, and
may be used for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes in later litigation. Prakash v.
American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ruple v. City of Vermillion, S.D., 714 i.2d
860 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984).
169. See P.K. MOSER, EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE, READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY EPISTE-
MOLOGY 7 (1986).
170. See H. REICHENBACH, EXPERIENCE AND PREDICATION, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FOUNDATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE 387 (1952).
171. Id.; see also E.P. PAPANoUTsos, THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE (1968).
"Knowledge begins with perception"-the simplest cognitive fact, the starting point of experi-
ence. With the aid of memory and reflective powers, we form concepts, i.e., justice-simple
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knowledge into components of inductive inferences: The structure of
scientific inferences is to be conceived as a concatenation of inductive
inferences, resting on ideas of probability. The transition from
probability to practical truth plays a decisive role, but the
probability character of the inferences is not always easily seen; the
short steps of inductive inferences can be combined into long chains
forming longer steps of so complicated a structure that it may be
difficult to see the inductive inference as the only atomic element in
them. 172 The atomic particles that form the structure of knowledge
or belief must be considered in relationship to each other. The belief
becomes justified only when the atomic particles, the inductive infer-
ences, logically support the conclusory belief.173
Justification takes two forms in epistomology, propositional and
doxastic. 174 Propositional occurs when a person's total evidence
makes a proposition likely to be true (more likely than its denial) on
that person's total evidence, even if the person believes it for the
wrong reason. Doxastic occurs when a proposition has propositional
justification for a person, and when that person believes it on the
basis of the justifying evidence. Thus, doxastic justification requires
that one's belief be appropriately related to one's evidence. 75 As the
epistemic model for summary judgment demonstrates, a court does
not need to have doxastic justification in ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment because the court is not searching for truth. 6
It is here that belief and truth take divergent paths. Because
clear forms of thought whose content is reached by removing peripheral elements. All concepts
have the following in common: "the cognitive function of knowledge proceeds by means of the
concept from the level of sense experience to that of logical formulations and distinctions." Id.
at 153.
172. H. REICHENBACH, supra note 170, at 387.
173. According to P.K. MOSER, supra note 169, at 4, a belief is epistemically justified
for a person only if that belief is more likely to be true, on that person's total evidence, than is
the denial of that belief, This likelihood is known as "confirmation." Thus, he writes, if a
proposition P is more likely to be true than its denial, not-P, then the truth of P is more
confirmed than the truth of not-P. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The search for truth has been the quest of philosophers throughout civilization.
According to some philosophers, truth is objective judgment based upon the material of experi-
ence and representations and is ordered and formed according to pure forms of understanding.
Truth is not the associative, subjective connection of representations. E.P. PAPANOUTSOS, supra
note 171, at 136-37. "There are questions regarding the truth or untruth of which it is not for
man to decide; all the capital questions, all the capital problems of valuation, are beyond
human reason." F.W. NIETZCHE, THE ANTICHRIST 157 (1888). Niels Bohr, a noted Danish
physicist, expressed a less restricted view of truth when he wrote: "There are trivial truths and
the great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false. The opposite of a great truth is
also true." GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS 46 (1985) (quoting N.Y. Times, Oct. 20,
1957).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL PRACTICE
truth is an elusive concept, epistemologists confine their trade to
studying the structure of what is perceived as knowledge, whether or
not that knowledge is truth. Judges may approach summary judg-
ment motions as junior epistemologists, not judging the truth of the
underlying contentions, but rather considering the foundations justi-
fying the parties' beliefs.
One scientist has identified three alternative foundation models
justifying empirical beliefs:177 The foundation of such belief termi-
nates in unjustified beliefs; the regress of such belief goes on indefi-
nitely (on never-ending building blocks of empirical knowledge); or
the foundation circles back on itself in some way. 17  The model most
clearly suited for the summary judgment standard is the third
model, known as the "epistemic coherence theory."' 79 Before apply-
ing the model to summary judgment motions, however, the theory
must be described in greater detail.' 80
The coherence theory is not linear in its series of justifications.
All justifications derive from coherent relations among beliefs, with
logical consistencies, logical implications, and coherence as the ex-
planation. 8' Consistency is a necessary condition for coherence. In
177. Empirical beliefs are those beliefs based on empirical, sensory or perceptual knowl-
edge, as contrasted with conclusory or a priori knowledge. See P.K. MOSER, supra note 169, at
3. Even the truth of empirical knowledge, the fundamental building block of beliefs, can be
disputed, according to Moser. "Philosophers have asked whether empirical knowledge is based
on beliefs that are indubitable (not subject to doubt), incorrigible (not subject to falsity), or
irrevisable (not subject to revision). It is doubtful whether any of our beliefs enjoys immunity
of indubitability, incorrigibility or irrevisability." id.
178. L. BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 87 (1985) (available at
University of Pittsburgh, Hillman library).
179. See J. DANCY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY 110-12
(1985).
180. Epistemic infinitism, in which the foundations for a belief consist of an indefinite
number of empirical beliefs, cannot be used for our model because a judge is presented with a
finite amount of evidence on summary judgment. Such a model would suppose that a judge's
decision could never be made because his examination of the evidence would be never-ending.
Epistemic infinitism is based on an endless regression of empirical beliefs. For example, B is
supported by B), which is supported by B2, ad infinitum. Beliefs in epistemic infinitism are
conditionally justified-justified only if their predecessors are justified. Epistemic infinitism is
not a favored model because at some point in the infinite chain it is probable that at least one
belief cannot be justified. P.K. MOSER, supra note 169, at 7-8.
An additional foundation has been labeled, "epistemic contextualism," in which the infer-
ential justification terminates ultimately in beliefs not in need of any justification. They are
"contextually basic" and do not find evidential support from anything, including themselves. A
belief may qualify as contextual as long as one's peers allow one to hold the belief without any
reasons. The contextualism flaw is that the theory supports the holding of self-contradictory
beliefs with no support so long as peers do not object. P.K. MOSER, supra note 169, at 8-9.
181. P.K. MOSER, supra note 169, at 7. Moser describes coherence as a logical consis-
tency as follows: "Two beliefs are coherent if and only if it is logically possible that both
beliefs are true. Coherence is an explanation, if one belief explains the truth or falsity of the
other." Id. at 5. "[Uinder this view, empirical knowledge does not have noninferentially, justi-
fied foundations, but works in a systematic, network-like structure." Id. at 7. (Noninferentially
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an entirely coherent system, "no proposition would be arbitrary,
every proposition would be entailed by the others jointly and even
singly, no proposition would stand outside the system."' 82 One sci-
entist noted that:
[T]o have a coherence theory of justification, we need to give a
good sense to the idea that justification can grow . . . . The
idea here will be that, as the set increases in size, we can hope
that each member of it is better explained by the rest. Explana-
tions can improve in quality; this accounts for the growth of
justification.' 18 3
A belief, therefore, is justified when it is based upon a set of
supporting coherent inferences or beliefs. For example, consider two
islands. The inhabitants of one island see only horses, deer, and
sheep, and believe that all animals have hooves, a true belief on their
island. The inhabitants of the other island see only ducks, geese, and
frogs, and believe that all animals have webbed feet, a true belief on
their island. This demonstrates the basic flaw of the coherence the-
ory; the theory does not consider any relation between a system of
beliefs and anything external to that system."8 4 Coherence, therefore,
is a matter of how well a body of component beliefs interact to pro-
duce an organized, tightly structured system of beliefs, "rather than
either a helter-skelter collection or a set of conflicting
subsystems."'' 8 5
Judges, moreover, can utilize the epistemic coherence model
when ruling on summary judgment motions. The model does not
seek absolute truth, but rather internal coherence based on the rela-
tionship among beliefs within a closed system of inferences. The
model requires the nonmoving party, as in Celotex,88 to come for-
ward with a justified belief rendering the movant's belief (or argu-
ment) logically inconsistent. When the set of all justified beliefs of-
fered by both parties is incoherent, and the movant's ultimate belief
(or argument) is inconsistent with that set of justified beliefs, the
court should deny summary judgment. Truth must be ascertained by
justified beliefs are justified beliefs whose justification does not depend on the justification of
further beliefs.).
182. J. DANCY, supra note 179, at 110.
183. Id. at 111.
184. L. BONJOUR, supra note 178, at 108. If coherence is the sole basis for empirical
justification, it follows that "a system of empirical beliefs might be adequately justified, indeed
might constitute empirical knowledge, in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world
that it purports to describe." Id.
185. Id. at 93.
186. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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the fact-finder at trial. 8"
Justified beliefs are not merely allegations contained in the
pleadings or the denials by the nonmovant, but rather consist of doc-
umentary evidence or affidavits based on fact and not opinion. Each
belief contained in the set of beliefs examined by the judge must be
justified by the whole of the evidence. When a belief is not justified
or supported, it should be discarded from the set. This is consistent
with the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which
requires the parties to set forth evidence, not allegations, in support
or opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 88
Under the epistemic model, frivolous cases can be eliminated on
summary judgment when the moving party sufficiently presents a set
of justified beliefs and the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence
to justify its own allegations within the standards required by Rule
56(e). Matsushita-type cases, however, may survive summary judg-
ment motions because courts are not permitted to look beyond the
set of justified beliefs presented by the parties. The epistemic model
bars consideration of propositions standing outside the system,8 9 and
also omits the Anderson concept of higher burdens of proof. 90 One
can argue that a nonmovant who produces evidence of a justified
belief that upsets the movant's coherent set of justified beliefs should
escape summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact
187. The epistemic coherence model can also be used to describe the jury deliberation
process, with one important exception. When the justified beliefs of the parties clash, jurors
may make credibility determinations and disregard or discount some of the evidence. Presuma-
bly, when unjustified beliefs are discarded from the set of beliefs (or evidence) presented at
trial, the ultimate belief is reached and justified (the verdict). Because the jury cannot consider
attorneys' statements, newspaper articles, outside publications, or comments made beyond the
courtroom, the verdict is justified only by the coherent relationships between the finite set of
supported beliefs presented in the courtroom. A pure coherence model suffers when jurors are
asked to apply their common sense and disparate life experiences in forming their decisions.
188. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be en-
tered against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
189. See J. DANCY, supra note 179, at 110.
190. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (nonmovant required to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to show it could meet the clear and convincing level of proof required
in libel cases).
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remains for the jury. Whether this degree of inconsistency rises to a
level necessary to prevent entry of judgment for the defendant in
libel or fraud cases (where the claimant faces a higher burden of
proof) is a question that is more appropriate for a fact-finder at trial
than a judge during pretrial motions.191
In summary, the epistemic coherence model demands that the
parties adequately support evidence presented pursuant to a sum-
mary judgment motion. The model restricts the court to the evidence
presented. The court's task is to determine if the presented evidence
paints a coherent picture of the movant's argument or belief. If the
combined set of justified beliefs of the plaintiff and defendant are
incoherent and do not justify the movant's belief, summary judgment
should be denied.
IV. Conclusion
Summary judgment is probably the most prevalent pretrial mo-
tion, and the most confusing. At one time, litigators were confident
that they could produce enough evidence to get the case before a
jury. Now, given the Matsushita, Celotex, and Anderson burdens of
proof required at the summary judgment stage, litigators present
their case through affidavits and documentary evidence-a paper
trial. Today, federal courts employ this super pretrial motion to dis-
pose of cases that judges perceive to be one-sided.
Unfortunately, the new summary judgment standard encourages
courts to weed out meritless cases by searching for the truth. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not address truth determinations on
summary judgment. The rule contemplates a determination of
whether the parties have presented a live, factual dispute that should
be settled at trial. To resolve summary judgment motions properly,
courts must consider all of the supported evidence submitted by both
191. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), wherein Justice Harlan stated:
[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some
earlier event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of
what happened. Instead, all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what proba-
bly happened. The intensity of this belief-the degree to which a factfinder is
convinced that a given act actually occurred--can, of course, vary. In this re-
gard, a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder con-
cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correct-
ness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. Although the
phrases "preponderance of the evidence" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the finder of fact different
notions concerning the degree of confidence he is expected to have in the correct-
ness of his factual conclusions.
Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL PRACTICE
parties, and determine whether the evidence justifies the movant's
belief without any supported evidence to the contrary. If the evi-
dence is not coherent and does not totally support the movant's pro-
position, the summary judgment motion should be denied.
Consider the following case under the super summary judgment
standard and the epistemic coherence model:
By all accounts, it was a typical teenage party. Herbert and Di-
ane Meussner of Butler County, Pennsylvania, were vacationing in
Virginia on July 13, 1981, when their children decided to invite a
few friends over to their house. At midnight, the party started to
break up. One guest, eighteen-year-old Lynn Ann Muto, decided to
stay at the house with her friend, Becky Meussner, and Becky's
brother Stephen. At approximately 3 a.m., a neighbor discovered the
Meussner house engulfed in flames. By the time help arrived, the
three teenagers had died of smoke inhalation and burns.
The administrator of Lynn Ann Muto's estate filed a complaint
claiming that Lynn's death was proximately caused by the negli-
gence of Stephen Meussner. The complaint, filed in the Court of
Common Pleas of Butler County, Pennsylvania, in 1982, alleged that
Stephen fell asleep with a lighted cigarette and caused the fire.192
Following discovery, the defendants, the administrators of Stephen's
estate, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff
possessed no evidence showing that Stephen was responsible for the
fire and that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not meet the
burden of proof required at trial.19
The plaintiff argued that, although no witness could testify that
Stephen was smoking in the house or that Stephen committed any
other act to cause the fire, circumstantial evidence created issues of
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Specifically,
the plaintiff noted that the point of the fire's origin was near a couch
in the living room, couches are not a combustible source, and some-
one's negligence probably caused the fire. Moreover, Stephen was
seen before the fire outside the house with a cigarette, and Stephen's
body was found closest to the point of origin.
Under super summary judgment, the court would grant the mo-
tion. The plaintiff cannot prove with the available evidence that Ste-
phen negligently caused the fire. As a matter of law, the court would
192. Muto v. Meussner, No. A.D. 82-757 (C.P. Butler County 1982).
193. The author, as defendants' counsel, made the motion for summary judgment. Al-
though the argument was similar to the holding in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986), the motion and its resolution predated Anderson.
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determine that there is insufficient evidence to argue that either of
the three victims was individually responsible for the fire. Under the
epistemic coherence model, however, the court would deny the mo-
tion. Some evidence of Stephen's negligence exists; his body was
found closest to the origin of the fire. Because someone's negligent
act probably caused the fire, the question of Stephen's negligence
rests on the jury's finding of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The court denied the motion because the defendant improperly
asked the court to resolve a factual issue."" The court correctly ac-
knowledged the principles underlying a motion for summary judg-
ment-the court is no more capable of determining the truth than a
jury.
194. Muto v. Meussner, No. A.D. 82-757 (C.P. Butler County 1982) (order denying
summary judgment). At the subsequent trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
